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76-9518

Executive Registry

76-3115/5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Theodore G. Shackley
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Progress on File Review

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 10 Dec 76 to DDCI from Deputy
Inspector General, same subject

In accordance with your comments of December 11 to the DDO on the need to show progress on the file review during the Christmas season, I have discussed the matter with Chief, Latin America Division who advises that the work is proceeding on schedule and will continue throughout the Christmas season.

Theodore G. Shackley
Theodore G. Shackley

cc: C/LA

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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E2 IMPDET
CL BY

25X1

HRP review completed

SECRET

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-3577

10 DEC
1978

Executive Registry
76-3115/3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT : Progress on File Review

1. We have been reviewing the progress in the file search being conducted on issues raised in the Schweiker report to see if we are not near the end. Both CI Staff and the Office of Security have completed their basic review and are prepared to make such contributions to a final paper as seem appropriate, when the larger research effort of LA Division is completed.

2. The LA Division task force has completed the detailed review of the 900 files of material originally identified, plus some 300 additional files identified in the first research. In the course of this study the attention of the researchers was drawn to the files of a specially sensitive operation (ZRKNICK); it was an FBI intercept operation of agent traffic. The nature of the material required extensive exchanges between the Bureau and CIA, with the names of a large number of personalities of possible interest. Some 12 boxes of this material have been reviewed, and there are two large boxes of index cards that are being reviewed further for leads to yet other files. In a sense this illustrates the problem of researching files not reviewed before for this purpose, but we believe that the effort is near the end.

3. Because the research has continued to lead to materials other than those identified originally, the project has extended well beyond the estimated time and is now coming into the Christmas season. A number of people detailed to the project have leave planned over the Christmas holidays unless you believe that the work should continue straight through. While I am impatient to conclude it, it seems appropriate to let the Christmas leave plans stand.


S. D. Breckinridge

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76-3577

INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-3577

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10 DEC 1976

Executive Registry
76-3115/3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT : Progress on File Review

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
S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

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1-2R

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7 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT : Research on Questions Raised by
Schweiker Report on Intelligence
Agencies Support of Warren Commission

1. As you recall we had aimed for a 30 September completion date on research by the study group. The main work was conceived as being in the old files of LA Division, with the Office of Security and CI Staff having less onerous tasks to perform. LA Division assigned two researchers to this task, who were expected to be able to handle it in a couple of months at the outside.

2. Unfortunately there have been a series of crash, ad hoc requirements that have pre-empted the time of the researchers assigned to this task by LA Division. Now, with the new House committee under Representative Downing operating under a short deadline, it is apparent that further new and demanding requirements will be received.

3. Discussions on the problem have been held with persons in the Operations Directorate, between Mr. Waller and Mr. Wells, and between me and people involved in this problem in LA Division. It is estimated that it will take another three to five highly qualified IA's to handle the problem. Unless some such manpower priority is established we will find ourselves embarrassed by our inability to respond both quickly or accurately to high-priority, high-volume requests for information.

4. Arrangements are being made to assign additional and appropriate personnel to this task, and it is hoped that we may thus be able to respond in timely fashion.

SD Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-2698

4 AUG 1976

Executive Registry
76-3115/1


MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DDCI

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT : Study Group and the Warren Commission
Issue

1. Attached are Terms of Reference for the review of the issues raised by the Schweiker committee. The problem is big, given the time that has passed and the research problem, and we may not be able to make the 30 September deadline. I don't want to stir the Senate oversight committee to an early inquiry on this issue, but if there is any indication that they are interested in the matter I would hope that we could get an agreement to give us as much time as is necessary to do a proper job. A copy of the attached is sent to you for your information because of your interest in the subject, and in hopes that if the issue does become active you may be able to forestall a precipitate request.

2. If you have any problems about this don't hesitate to raise them.



S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment a/s

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-2696

4 AUG 1976

76-3115

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: S. D. Breckinridge
Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT: Working Group on Book V, Final SSC
Report

1. I have been discussing with representatives of the CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security how to approach the question of reviewing the SSC Subcommittee report on intelligence support for the Warren Commission. The problem is complicated by the range of subject matter, the report of the SSC Subcommittee, the extensive Agency files that will have to be reviewed, and the dispersal of personnel directly familiar with the activities in question.

2. We have settled on a general statement of the scope of our inquiry, which is reflected in the attached Terms of Reference. New points of inquiry may develop in the course of our review, and some of the points included in the Terms of Reference may prove to be of marginal significance. We believe that some interviews will be required of personnel now retired, which we will refer to you for consideration as the occasion arises.

3. Because of the volume of files to be reviewed we have set a tentative date of 30 September for the completion of the study, although it may well end up taking more time. As we are not working against a known requirement from the new Senate oversight committee, it may well develop that we will have more time to pursue specific points and refine the treatment of the more complex issues.

4. Unless you have further instructions to provide we intend to proceed as stated above.

S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment a/s

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4 AUG 1976

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR REVIEW OF
ISSUES RAISED IN
BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
FINAL REPORT

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses-- (1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general background it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in support of the thesis.

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3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so provocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy. There were other operations with the unqualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was ordered through 1964?

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- (10) What were the parameters of these instructions?
- (11) What responses were there and where are they?
- (12) What evidence is there that the "provocation" theory was considered during the Warren Commission enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?
- (13) What action was taken with reference to this concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?
- (14) What records are there on this and where are they?
- (15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection?
- (16) What form did they take?
- (17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject?
- (18) What action developed from these exchanges?
- (19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they?
- (20) To what extent were elements of the Agency other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in investigating the assassination during the Warren Commission tenure?
- (21) What is the total CIA information on the two flights from Mexico City to Havana?
- (22) What was done at the time to develop further information on this matter?
- (23) Can further information be acquired on this matter now?

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- (24) What is the total CIA information on "D"?
- (25) Is further information on "D" needed in view of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it?
- (26) What information does CIA have on Oswald FPCC relations?
- (27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans training activity and was anything provided on this to the Warren Commission?
- (28) What is the total CIA information on "A"?
- (29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?
- (30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December 1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?
- (31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban assassination policies and programs up to November 22, 1963?
- (32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's 7 September 1963 statements re retribution?
- (33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA employees contain anything on the above questions? If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine any additional relevant information on this plot.

- (1) What is the total information on the plots involving the criminal syndicates?
- (2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate operation?

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(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office of Security officer may have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro. What is the total CIA information on these?

(5) What is the significance on the subject of provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete record, there are points that should be addressed particularly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report. For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1 when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

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c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection with the investigation? An effort should be made to list these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requirement at the time, but what was omitted and why.


4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U. S. policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions raised in the Schweiker report.




S. D. Breckinridge
O/Inspector General



Robert Wall
CI Staff



William Sturbitts
LA Division



Raymond Reardon
O/Security

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INTERNAL
USE ONLY

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

IG

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Deputy Inspector General

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

10 December 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDCI

BX-3

12/11

Hh

m

Executive Registry

76-3115/4

2.

DDO

To 2

Bill:

I have no desire to be a Scrooge in this matter but can you please look into this -- to the extent that DDO personnel are involved in the review -- and try to insure that some progress continues through the Season.

HK
12/11

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12.

13.

14.

15.

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FORM
3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

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Approved For Release



INTERNAL USE ONLY

2003/12/02

CIA-RDP79M00467



CONFIDENTIAL

A000300070016-5



SECRET

3115

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Deputy Inspector General

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE

4 AUG 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

[Redacted]

Assistant

to the DDCI

2.

bx3

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

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14.

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CIA-RDP79M00467

A000300070016-5

FORM 3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS



SECRET



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

h.

FROM:

Deputy Inspector General

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

4 August 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

HK

2. ~~Secretary B~~

3. Deputy IG

*To 2
Any comment?
HK*

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

HRP review completed

15.

*To 3:
Scott
Thanks
Proceed as you
intend.
HK*